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Trends
ADHD is one of the most common
psychiatric disorders during childhood,
but the neurocognitive mechanisms
behind it remain elusive.
Behaviourally, ADHD is best character-
ized by increased variability across
multiple cognitive domains and
timescales.
By using Marr's three levels of analysis,
we show how impairments in neural
gain can explain ADHD abnormalities,
spanning from behaviour to neural
activity.
On an algorithmic and implementation
level, we show how increased variabil-
ity can be caused by neural gain impair-
ments, and how it can be modelled
using reinforcement learning and corti-
costriatal network models.
We furthermore show how these levels
can be linked to impairments in cate-
cholamine systems (dopamine and
noradrenaline).
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Attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), one of the most common psy-
chiatric disorders, is characterised by unstable response patterns across mul-
tiple cognitive domains. However, the neural mechanisms that explain these
characteristic features remain unclear. Using a computational multilevel
approach, we propose that ADHD is caused by impaired gain modulation in
systems that generate this phenotypic increased behavioural variability. Using
Marr's three levels of analysis as a heuristic framework, we focus on this variable
behaviour, detail how it can be explained algorithmically, and how it might be
implemented at a neural level through catecholamine inﬂuences on cortico-
striatal loops. This computational, multilevel, approach to ADHD provides a
framework for bridging gaps between descriptions of neuronal activity and
behaviour, and provides testable predictions about impaired mechanisms.
The Need for a Better Neurocomputational Understanding of ADHD
Maintaining one's mental focus is hard, especially when reading a dry and complicated paper.
Suddenly you would rather clean the kitchen or surf the Internet. Nevertheless, most people
maintain focus and persist with the task at hand. Neurobiologically, we propose that the
catecholaminergic brain systems (see Glossary) modulate attention [1] by increasing the
neural gain and, thus, suppressing cognitive switching [2] (Box 1).
For 5% of the population, the ability to focus is disturbed to an extent that strongly affects their
daily functioning. Many are diagnosed with ADHD [3], a developmental psychiatric disorder
thought to arise, in part, out of a genetic vulnerability [4]. ADHD is characterised by inattention,
hyperactivity, and/or impulsivity [5] and its negative effects on a person's occupational success,
wellbeing, and health risks (e.g., for substance abuse [6]) make it important to understand this
disorder.
Research on ADHD has intensiﬁed since the early 1990s [6] without clear candidate genes or
brain response patterns predicting the disorder having been identiﬁed. There is no unifying
theory explaining the pathophysiology of ADHD. Indeed, current classiﬁcation criteria are likely to
subsume multiple brain disorders with a similar behavioural expression within the label ‘ADHD’.
Here, we use a multilevel approach to propose that ADHD crucially involves an impairment of
neural gain modulation leading to inappropriately variable behaviour. By using Marr's three
levels of analysis [7] (Box 2), we show how it is possible to translate behavioural ﬁndings intoTrends in Neurosciences, February 2016, Vol. 39, No. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2015.12.009 63
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Glossary
Attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD): a developmental
psychiatric disorder characterised by
inattention, hyperactivity, and/or
impulsivity [5]. With a prevalence of
approximately 5%, it is one of the
most common psychiatric disorders
during childhood [3].
Attractors, neural: when perturbed
by external inputs, neural networks
change the pattern of activity of their
nodes (i.e., neurons). Recurrently
connected neural networks exhibit
nonlinear associations between
inputs and patterns of activity,
exhibiting state transitions towards
either stable patterns (e.g., point
attractors) or dynamic or complex
patterns (e.g., chaotic attractors).
Attractors share the common feature
that different inputs converge
towards the same stable or dynamic
pattern and this ﬁnal pattern tends to
resist further input perturbation (see
the supplemental information online).
Catecholaminergic system:
neurotransmitter systems involving
dopamine (DA) and noradrenaline
(NA). The catecholaminergic nuclei
are located in the midbrain (DA:
ventral tegmental area and substantia
nigra; NA: locus coeruleus) and
project to large parts of the brain
(Box 1, main text). Catecholamines
are thought to modulate ongoing
neural activity by modulating signal
gain at the synapse.
Continuous performance task
(CPT): behavioural task to test
sustained attention and executive
functions [10]. Participants see a
sequence of random letters and have
to respond when the letter
combination ‘A’-‘X’ appears in
sequence. For all other stimuli and
stimulus combinations, participants
have to withhold a response.
Performance is mainly measured by
their error rates as errors of
commission and omission (cf below).
Decision temperature t: the
exchange rate between how much
we tempt an agent (or stimulate a
model neuron) and how much they
change their behaviour. Say an agent
is indifferent between options A
versus B (or a neuron between ﬁring
versus not ﬁring), with t = US $ 10 (or
t = 10 mV). Adding DV = t to the
value of A (or t to the neural input)
will shift behaviour by 23% towards
preferring A (or maximal ﬁring). There
are interesting reasons for not always
Box 1. Neural Gain: Catecholamines Regulating Stability of Neuronal Systems
The brain can be thought of as a signal-processing machine that selects relevant information to act. Overburdening with
information means that it needs to decide which aspects of its inputs to treat as important by boosting these relevant
signals, and which aspects to treat as unimportant and attenuate. The brain cannot just rely on amplifying the strongest
signal and ﬁltering out everything else, but must keep a balance between competing signals according to environmental
and internal demands. The degree to which neural signals are ampliﬁed or suppressed has been termed ‘neural gain’ and
this effect can be mimicked by a sigmoidal function (Equation I):
fG xð Þ ¼ 11 þ e GxþBð Þ ; [I]
where an input signal x is ampliﬁed by the neural gain factor G [70] (Figure IA).
In high neural gain states (Figure IA, orange), neural populations strengthen strong and attenuate weak incoming signals.
This leads to neural representations that are less susceptible to noise [71]. Such states are most beneﬁcial in conditions
where the brain needs to avoid distraction, such as ﬂeeing from a predator.
By contrast, in low neural gain states (Figure IB, blue), the system is not dominated by the most prevalent signals and,
thus, it is more likely to detect weaker signals that may carry important information [29]. Such states can be helpful
because weak, but important, information might be carried in a nondominant channel. For example, seeing the silhouette
of a predator in the grass or in the periphery of vision.
Neural gain can also be related to neural attractor states: high gain leads to stable behaviours and attractor states
where neural networks quickly converge to stable ﬁring patterns (Figure IC, pink starting states quickly and consistently
result in the same end states; cf supplemental information online). However, low gain is characterised by variable attractor
states and behaviours (Figure ID, pink starting states end up in multiple unstable states).
Neural gain should affect widespread neural populations. Thus, it is not surprising that the catecholaminergic neuro-
transmitter systems [i.e., dopamine (DA) and noradrenaline (NA)] have been found to function as neural gain modulators
[31,70–72]. Both systems innervate many cortical and subcortical areas (Figure IB). Moreover, these systems modulate
ongoing neural activity, rather than sending their own excitatory or inhibitory signals [29,70,73].
Although catecholaminergic systems have many similarities, they serve different functions: DA has strong projections to
prefrontal and striatal areas and has mainly been associated with learning and reward-related information processing
[40]. By contrast, NA mainly innervates prefrontal areas and, to a lesser extent, striatal areas [73]. It also subserves a
general focussing on relevant information, irrespective of the cognitive domain [74]. However, clearer distinctions are yet
to be drawn that might eventually help to diagnose impairments of either system.
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Figure I. Neural Gain and Catecholamines. (A) Neural gain has an amplifying effect on neuronal signals by boosting
strong inputs. (B) Catecholamine systems are crucial for modulating brain-wide neural gain. On a network-level, (C) high
gain leads to stable attractor states and thus consistent outputs and behaviours, whereas (D) low gain causes unstable
and shallow attractor states.mathematical algorithms and neural circuit impairments (and vice versa). This approach also
provides fruitful hypotheses about potential neurobiological subgroups, which could be the
object of future investigation.
Neurocognitive Impairments in ADHD
To understand a psychiatric disorder, it is important to unite several levels of impairments
spanning symptoms, behaviour, neural, and neurochemical markers. Here, we selectively review64 Trends in Neurosciences, February 2016, Vol. 39, No. 2
preferring the estimated-best option,
including: (i) uncertainty about its
estimated value; (ii) need to explore;
(iii) choice error (aka ‘trembling
hand’); and (iv) ecological concerns,
such as resource conservation and
equity of distribution between agents.
t is called ‘decision temperature’
because the formula in Box 1 (main
text) is a rewriting of Boltzmann's
law, whereby a bigger energy gap (cf
stimulus or reward) is required to
persuade a high-temperature physical
system to stay in its most likely state
(cf preferred output or action).
Delay gratiﬁcation and
intertemporal choice: tasks that
examine what is thought to be
behavioural impulsivity. Participants
have to decide between smaller
rewards, which are more proximate
in time, and bigger rewards, which
are further away in the future. These
tasks capture how much a person is
impatient and devalues beneﬁts the
might arise in the future. Usually,
discounting behaviour is described as
a hyperbolic function with a
discounting parameter k and a
decision function as described in Box
3 (main text).
Error of commission: erroneous
response by accidentally responding
in a phase where one was to
withhold one's answer. In the CPT,
responses are rated as errors of
commission if a response is given
that does not follow an A-X letter
sequence.
Error of omission: erroneous
response by withholding to response
to a target stimulus. In the CPT, an
error of omission is counted if a
participant fails to respond to an A-X
letter sequence.
Marr's three level of analysis:
David Marr described in his highly
inﬂuential book Vision [7] that to fully
understand how the brain solves a
problem (e.g., vision), one has to
explain it on three different levels:
computational, algorithmic, and
implementation (Box 2, main text).
The computational level asks about
the theoretical background; that is,
about the goal of a certain
computation (e.g., why do we see?).
The algorithmic level asks about the
mathematical implementations, so
how can information be processed to
solve the computational problem (e.
g., recognising edges of objects). The
implementation level then analyses
how this is solved on a neuronal level
Box 2. Mechanisms of Psychiatric Disorders: From Behaviour to Neurons and Back
Psychiatric disorders are classically diagnosed based on symptom reports and clinical observations. These clinical
features are rarely diagnostic of speciﬁc underlying pathological mechanisms. Here, we propose a multilevel approach to
understand psychiatric disorders and their neural underpinnings. To generate hypotheses about malfunctioning brain
systems, a ﬁne-grained dissection of a patient's behaviour is important. Once consistent behavioural signatures have
been found (e.g., increased response variability), we have to bridge the gap between behaviour and the neural processes
that give rise to this behaviour. At the most abstract level, we formulate the key computational issue, that is, establish
what problem the brain tries to solve (e.g., an optimal balance between exploiting a good foraging ground and exploring
new grounds). Here, we try to answer this question from a normative perspective. Subsequently, we have to formulate
how the problem is solved. At this ‘algorithmic level’, reinforcement learning has been shown to be useful [65]. Models
should fulﬁl several requirements: (i) a good match of model predictions with the actual behaviour of an agent; (ii) model
must outperform other (more simple and more complex) models in terms of model evidence; (iii) the model should have
high biological plausibility (e.g., phasic DA studies lend support to RPE reinforcement learning models). Model and
parameter comparison in health versus disease can then elucidate processes that underpin impairments (e.g., decision
temperature parameter driving variability in ADHD; [16]). Model predictions from the algorithmic level can be used to
inform data such as neuroimaging, which seeks to identify neural correlates and dynamics. By using model-derived
predictions (e.g., RPEs), we can look for regions (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex) whose activity to model on the level
below, thus connecting algorithmic with implementation levels. At the latter level, we can then simulate complex
dynamics of neuronal systems to understand impairments. Here, we can test how problematic catecholamine systems
can affect behaviour and neural activity. Thus, we can formulate new theories about neural mechanisms and potential
subgroups, such as low striatal DA versus decreased frontal NA subgroups in ADHD.
Using such multilevel approaches in computational psychiatry [75,76] helps link several levels of symptom analysis
(behaviour, algorithmic, and neuronal). By ﬁnding new diagnostic subgroups, we can in principle reﬁne therapies, based
on more speciﬁc predictions about the efﬁcacy of medication (e.g., stimulant versus nonstimulant medication) or of
therapies engaging speciﬁc learning mechanisms (cognitive-behavioral therapy, neurofeedback) (Figure I).
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Figure I. Modelling Psychiatric Disorders Across Marrian Levels of Analysis Helps Reﬁning and Understanding the
Mechanisms of these Disorders.the most consistent neurocognitive impairments and go on to argue that these can all be
explained by impaired neural gain.
Behavioural Markers: The Consistency of Inconsistencies
Behavioural ﬁndings in ADHD are numerous, and here we conﬁne ourselves to a general pattern
of ADHD-related impairments consistently present across domains and tasks.
Reaction Time Variability
One of the most consistent ﬁndings in subjects with ADHD is an increase in reaction time (RT)
variability (such as RT standard deviations). This is reliably found across many tasks, laborato-
ries, and countries [8] and is one of the best behavioural classiﬁers for ADHD [9].Trends in Neurosciences, February 2016, Vol. 39, No. 2 65
(e.g., by orientation-speciﬁc neuronal
columns).
Positron emission tomography
(PET): invasive neuroimaging
technique, mainly used to quantify
speciﬁc receptor densities or
availabilities. Due to the invasiveness
and the exposure to radioactive
tracers, PET is not used with children
with ADHD.
Reward prediction error (RPE):
hypothetical error signals originally
derived from reinforcement learning
theory [65]. RPEs describe the
discrepancy between expected and
received outcomes (or rewards) and
drive learning about the value of
stimuli and/or behaviours. Since the
discovery that phasic DA signals in
the ventral tegmental area closely
reﬂect model-derived RPE signals
[40], a huge body of literature has
shown that such dopaminergically
driven RPE signals are processed in
multiple areas of the brain, such as
the ventral striatum or the medial
prefrontal lobe [66–69].Response Inconsistencies
Simple response tasks, such as the continuous performance task (CPT, Box 3), require a
participant to respond to prelearned target stimuli while withholding an action for nontarget
stimuli. This simple response-to-target, nonresponse-to-nontarget pattern is used in a
variety of task settings that investigate different cognitive domains, such as attention
(alertness, vigilance, and sustained attention tasks), response inhibition (Go/NoGo and
Flanker tasks), or working memory (n-back tasks). Across all these tasks, patients with
ADHD generally make less target-related responses (errors of omission) and more non-
target responses (errors of commission) [10]. Subsequently, we use the CPT as an
example of these response biases and to illustrate how these impairments can be caused
by decreased neural gain (Boxes 3 and 4).
Decision Making and Reward Learning
In the context of neuroeconomic approaches to behaviour, decision-making has received
considerable attention from the ADHD community [11–15]. However, relatively few studies
have used neuroeconomic tasks and models that address actual mechanisms and their putative
impairment in ADHD. In one of the ﬁrst such studies, Hauser et al. [16] investigated decision-
making in adolescent patients with ADHD using learning models and found that an increased
decision temperature parameter (Box 3) accounted for the more stochastic behaviour seen in
ADHD. This is in line with previous computational and animal work relating ADHD-like behaviours
to decision temperature [17]. Other studies investigated delay gratiﬁcation and temporal
discounting to study impulsivity in ADHD. While such initial reports suggested increased
discounting in ADHD, more recent studies reveal a more complex picture [18]. However, we
note evidence that increased discounting is strongly associated with increased choice variability
[19].
Neural Markers: The Catecholaminergic Systems
In contrast to other psychiatric disorders, ADHD has relatively few candidate neurotransmitter
systems. Studies from different ﬁelds have converged on the catecholamine neurotransmitter
systems (Box 1) dopamine (DA) and noradrenaline (NA) as contributing to the impairments seen
in ADHD [13,20–23].
Methylphenidate is a highly effective treatment in ADHD whose mode of action is a targeting
of dopaminergic reuptake from synaptic cleft [24]. By preferentially blocking the re-uptake of
DA, methylphenidate increases synaptic DA and, hence, dopaminergic transmission. Non-
stimulant medications, such as atomoxetine, more speciﬁcally target the noradrenergic
system in prefrontal areas and may be more effective in patients with a putative deﬁcit in
NA regulation [25]. While atomoxetine prevents NA from being removed from the synaptic
cleft, other drugs speciﬁcally stimulate /2-adrenoceptors rather than acting on all NA
receptor types [22,26].
A source of more direct evidence comes from human positron emission tomography (PET)
and animal studies that suggest a hypofunction in a DA system in striatal and prefrontal areas in
ADHD [13,14,21,23,27]. Less evidence is available for NA involvement due to methodological
reasons [21]. In addition, genetic studies implicate DA- and NA-related genes in ADHD
[6,22,28].
In line with the relatively widespread effects of neural gain in the brain [29], functional neuroim-
aging in ADHD has revealed multiple brain networks as affected [6,30], including the striatum [15]
and medial prefrontal cortex [16,30]. It is of interest that both are densely innervated and
modulated by catecholamines [31–33] and show deﬁcient functioning during task performance
and at rest [30,34].66 Trends in Neurosciences, February 2016, Vol. 39, No. 2
Deﬁcient Neural Gain Modulation in ADHD
Here, we illustrate how lowering neural gain at the neurophysiological (implementation) and
algorithmic levels can induce ADHD-like neurocognitive impairments. To understand why the
brain uses neural gain modulation to guide behaviour in the ﬁrst place, we ﬁrst discuss the
importance of balancing between choice stability and choice variability from a theoretical
standpoint.
Computational Level: Why Arbitrate between Stable and Unstable Behaviours?
So far, we have concluded that a consistent feature of ADHD is an increased variability in
behaviour. According to Marr, the ﬁrst level of analysis should describe the problem a system (i.
e., the brain) faces and how it tries to solve it [7]. So why should the healthy brain allow for
substantial behavioural variability? Why does the brain not always select the option with the
highest returns according to the information available? Why do we sometimes go for options that
are not the best and explore? We note that this is not about simple imperfection, because there
are numerous biological functions that are executed with engineering precision.
The dilemma that the brain has to solve arises from acting in environments where different
options may change their value for the subject. Agents not only have to exploit the option it
estimates as the best, but must also explore the value of alternative options so as to gather more
information [35,36]. One example is foraging, where different trees may change the amount of
fruits they carry. Thus, it is more adaptive to occasionally try alternative trees. This might be
particularly important in a developmental context, where a child has a limited prior knowledge
about an environment and, thus, can proﬁt from exploring unknown environments.
From both a reinforcement learning and information theoretic perspective, the arbitration
between different options is construed as balancing ‘exploitation’ and ‘exploration, information
gathering’. This is a hard problem to solve, but there are simple, well-established, methods, such
as randomly sampling from one's beliefs, or Thomson sampling [37]. Recent neuroscientiﬁc
work suggests that both immediate utility and information gathering drive our behaviour [38]. We
note that controlled addition of noise to a system to optimise its behaviour is by no means
conﬁned to decision-making and applies to many problem-solving systems (e.g., stochastic
resonance or simulated annealing).
The increased variability in ADHD can be seen as altered exploitation–exploration trade-off. In
paradigms with no uncertainty, increased exploration makes no sense; by contrast, in a natural
environment, the optimal amount of attentional stability, in view of uncertainty, is a matter of
degree. Moving to a societal level, increased exploratory behaviour in a proportion of the
population may be advantageous. Simulations by Williams and Taylor [39] demonstrate that
groups with 5% of ADHD-like agents show optimal foraging behaviours and increased survival,
and may explain why ADHD remains prevalent in the population despite its negative effects on
the individual.
In summary, the brain has to arbitrate between either exploiting currently preferred options or
sampling alternatives and learn from experience. While low exploration in most members of a
group ensures stability, a low proportion of people with ADHD allows learning from exploration
and, thus, can be evolutionarily beneﬁcial for a group.
Algorithmic Level: How to Arbitrate between Exploitation and Exploration?
The second level of Marr asks how a problem is solved. Speciﬁcally, it asks for mathematical
descriptions of how the system solves its task. In recent years, these approaches have gained
increased interest. Bayesian reasoning and reinforcement learning theories in particular have
provided biologically useful algorithms that the brain appears to exploit [40–44].Trends in Neurosciences, February 2016, Vol. 39, No. 2 67
Can reinforcement learning account for behavioural variability across different tasks and cogni-
tive domains? In Box 3, we propose that increased variability can be explained by an altered
action selection process. At the core of this action, selection process is the decision temper-
ature parameter t, a measure of choice stochasticity. It describes to what extent the agent
sticks to what it effectively believes to be the best choice. Higher decision temperatures make
the agent more likely to choose from options currently estimated to have less-than-maximum
values. By contrast, lower temperatures make the agent choose the highest value option more
often, thereby avoiding alternatives even if they have almost the same value (Box 3). Thus,
increasing t elicits more variable behaviours, even in simple stimulus–response tasks. A similarBox 3. How Neural Gain Affects Action Selection: The Algorithmic Level
Mathematical accounts of decision making and learning allow underlying mechanisms to be formalised in precise terms.
Such formulations were ﬁrst introduced during the early 20th century by Hull, Thorndike, and others, and have
experienced a renaissance in recent years. Models based on reinforcement learning (RL) theory [65] have proved to
be particularly useful to describe neural processes, such as phasic DA [40].
Reinforcement learning models often invoke two complementary modules: a valuation module that describes how values
are learned or inferred from environmental cues, and a second module that describes an action selection process that
explains how an agent selects between multiple choice options. It does this by taking the observation into account that
humans and animals do not always choose the best option exploitatively, but select the option with a frequency
proportional to its value (Herrnstein's matching law [77]). This is usually formulated as a softmax decision function
(Equation I):
p aið Þ ¼ e
Q aið Þ=t
XN
k¼1
eQ akð Þ=t
; [I]
where the probability of choosing option ai is relative to the value of the alternative options Q a1...Nð Þ½ . Importantly, the
decision arbitration is modulated by a decision temperature parameter t. This parameter moderates how deterministically
the selection process follows the goodness of the choice options. In other words, the temperature t dictates whether an
agent strictly exploits the best option or whether it shows a more variable behaviour that allows selection of options with
lower values. A low temperature parameter t (Figure IA, orange) determines a high exploitative behaviour, whereas a high
temperature parameter t stands for an exploratory, variable behaviour (Figure IA, blue).
The neural implementation of a decision temperature t (or its inverse formulation: precision) has only recently started to be
studied. In decision-making and planning, t is proposed to be encoded by DA [78,79]. More recent accounts of
noradrenergic neural gain also render a likely modulator of a decision temperature [29,74,80]. This is reasonable because
high neural gain more strongly suppresses low-valued options and boosts high-valued options, rendering action
selection more deterministic, whereas low neural gain dissociates less strongly between these options and facilitates
selection of nonoptimal options.
Here, we illustrate how an increased decision temperature can mimic ADHD variability in the CPT (Figure IB, cf
supplemental information online), where subjects have to respond when an A-X-sequence appears and an increased
temperature causes ADHD-like error patterns (Figure IC).
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Figure I. Algorithmic Level of Neural Gain Impairment. On the algorithmic level, (A) neural gain can be described by a
change in the softmax decision steepness parameter. (B) Simulated data of the continuous performance task illustrates the
effect of that parameter: (C) low gain renders behaviour more variable and ADHD-like (reference data from Losier et al. [10]).
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effect has been shown in the context of delay gratiﬁcation [17]. It is important to note that, in
temporal discounting, subjects with high temperatures also tend to have high discounting
preferences [19]. Lower temperatures are good for exploiting current beliefs, while higher ones
help exploration of uncertain options, as well as evening out resource utilisation.
In the context of learning and decision-making, previous theories [12,14] proposed that impaired
learning would elicit ADHD-like behaviour, driven by impoverished reward prediction error
(RPE) signals. However, recent empirical data that addressed learning and decision-making in
ADHD demonstrated that ADHD participants are not well characterized by impaired learning, but
instead by an increased decision temperature [16].
We can tentatively conclude that increased variability at the algorithmic level is explained by an
increased decision temperature in relation to an action selection process. We suggest that this is
likely to be underpinned by lowered neural gain, potentially caused by malfunctioning catechol-
amine systems (Box 3) and altered connectivity [45,46]. Neural underpinnings apart, an under-
standing of the key deﬁcits of ADHD at the algorithmic (information-processing) level may inform
learning-based treatments for this disorder, for which there is currently great demand but limited
evidence as to their efﬁcacy [47,48].
Implementation Level: How Does Gain Affect Computations in Neural Loops?
The implementational level asks how the algorithm functions of the second level are realised in
neural hardware, that is, in this instance, how the brain circuits instantiate and dynamically select
between different options, what structural change is associated with an hypothesised neural
gain impairment, and how this is translated into behavioural dysfunctions.
Neural models of corticostriatal circuits provide tools to study a catecholaminergic modulation of
behavioural selection processes, such as the effects of reduced DA in striatal areas. Since
reﬁned maps of DA receptor distributions in the striatum are established, the majority of these
models investigate the role of DA [49,50]. Such models describe how information is propagated
from the striatum to the cortex (and back) through multiple pathways, and how these loops
process and represent complex information. Striatal DA has a crucial role in this information
processing (Box 4) and these models have been successful in describing neural processes
underlying motor impairments in disorders such as Parkinson's disease (PD) [51–53]. Previous
corticostriatal models have also been successful in describing ADHD-like response inhibition
and working memory deﬁcits, but do not explain increased response variability through DA
impairments [23]. Recent reﬁnements in understanding the speciﬁc functions of the basal ganglia
pathways [54,55] have led to a substantial change in how we think of a D2-driven indirect
pathway that allows us to account for ADHD-related variability by means of DA impairments (Box
4) [56,57]. This has also facilitated an understanding of why the same pharmacological increase
in DA can improve disorders that are at the opposite side of a motor activity spectrum, namely
ADHD and PD. Few frontostriatal loop models have considered the contribution of other
catecholamines, such as NA. Notably, Frank et al. [23] showed that impaired NA function
increased behavioural variability as seen in ADHD by changing neural gain in prefrontal areas.
The aforementioned models of corticostriatal loops demonstrate that multiple impairments in
neural gain (such as decreased frontal NA [23] or lowered striatal DA efﬁcacy [56]) can cause
increased behavioural variability. This raises interesting new questions that can be addressed in
future behavioural, modelling, and (pharmaco-) neuroimaging work. Key here is to understand
how different catecholamines can be dissociated, not only in terms of their impact on behaviour,
but also with respect to the neural correlates of these impairments. Moreover, it is important to
determine which receptor types are involved in ADHD. We consider it likely that different ADHD
subgroups can be characterised by speciﬁc receptor impairments and, thus, a speciﬁcTrends in Neurosciences, February 2016, Vol. 39, No. 2 69
Box 4. How Neural Gain Changes Stability in Corticostriatal Loops
The basal ganglia are highly organised neural nuclei characterised by parallel processing. In mammals, several partially
segregated corticostriatal loops have been described (Figure IA), where, for example, the cortical motor area and frontal
area provide differentiated input to separate parts of the basal ganglia and receive in turn their speciﬁc processed output,
via the thalamus [57].
The dynamics of these circuits are often characterised as attractor states, where the strength of the attractors scale with
the strength of the feedback loop (cf supplemental information online). Dopaminergic drive modulates this feedback,
altering the quality and strength of information conveyed from the cortex, via the striatum, through the internal pathways
of the basal ganglia.
Under low DA drive, neural activity and signal differentiation in a direct and indirect pathway are comparable in strength,
resulting in signal interference at the level of the output nuclei of the basal ganglia, due to the opposing information
received from the two pathways (Figure IB, middle panel). This interference weakens the gain of the re-entrant system,
altering the signal originally present in the cortex to the point of almost cancelling any differentiation among stimuli. Thus,
weak gain is characterised by shallow attractors, where noise can easily bias activity of the network, triggering new state
transitions, and resulting in high behavioural variability.
Conversely, high dopamine drive results in strong signal differentiation in the direct pathway (due to the ampliﬁcation
effect of strongly active D1 receptors), and weak signal differentiation in the indirect pathway (due to the compression
effect of strongly active D2). Activity in the direct pathway is coherent with the gain of the loop, so that high differentiation
in the direct pathway nuclei sums up with the initial differentiation present in the cortex, eventually suppressing noise and
competing signals, causing behavioural stability (Figure IB, right panel).
We propose that ADHD is characterized by signal loss due to low gain. Unable to differentiate correctly among competing
stimuli, selection of goals and attentional targets becomes unstable, increasing errors of both commission and omission
as well as RT variability (Figure IB, bottom). Importantly, low gain in any of these loops is not necessarily associated with
low DA release, and can also be caused by reduced concentration of either D1 or D2 receptors in the striatum.
Pharmacological increase of the DA drive can restore the balance between signals represented in the two pathways,
reducing interference and stabilising the system. Moreover, impairments of other catecholamines, such as NA, may also
elicit similar effects on neural gain and behaviour [23]. Thus, it would be important to further reﬁne the precise
mechanisms in how these impairments might be dissociable on a neural or behavioural level.
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Figure I. Neural Gain Impairments Drive Behavioral Variability in Corticostriatal Loops. (A) Corticostriatal loop
models describe how information is processed and represented in these loops. (B) Under low neural gain, differentiation
of representations is poor and behavior unstable. High gain leads to clearly differentiated representations and stable
behavior. Abbreviations: GPe, globus pallidus externus; GPi, globus pallidus internus; NAcc, nucleus accumbens; SNr,
substantia nigra; STN, subthalamic nucleus; Str, striatum; Thal, thalamus.neurocognitive pattern. For example, our corticostriatal loop models [2,56] suggest that neural
gain impairments can be caused by either reduced DA release in the striatum or impairment at
the level of D1 or D2 receptors. Current PET studies support an impaired striatal DA release as
well as changes in D2 receptor density [21]. For NA, ADHD has mainly been associated with
impairments in /2-adrenoceptors [26,58], known to boost prefrontal representations [58,59].70 Trends in Neurosciences, February 2016, Vol. 39, No. 2
Outstanding Questions
Can we dissociate different forms of
neural gain impairment (e.g., DA versus
NA; prefrontal versus striatal; /- versus
b-adrenoceptor subtypes)
behaviourally?
What are the unique features of NA and
DA gain impairments behaviourally,
algorithmically, and in neural loop
models?
How can (computational) non-invasive
neuroimaging contribute to dissociat-
ing different forms of neural gain
impairment?
Can a neural gain-based classiﬁcation
of subgroups be predictive of pharma-
cological treatment efﬁciency? Can the
understanding of the associated infor-
mation processing inform
psychotherapy?More recent evidence also highlights the importance of b-adrenoceptors for modulating neural
gain [60]. Only by ﬁnding speciﬁc neurocognitive markers of catecholaminergic impairment, we
will be able to obtain neurobiologically valid ADHD subtypes and, thus, reﬁne the targeting of
pharmacological therapy (see Outstanding Questions). Moreover, such reﬁnements of ADHD
subtypes could facilitate nonpharmacological interventions, such as neurofeedback [47,61–64]
and transcranial brain stimulation, allowing a focus on more speciﬁc neural substrates (Box 2).
Concluding Remarks
To understand psychiatric disorders such as ADHD it is important to determine which neuro-
cognitive processes go awry, and how. Psychiatry has traditionally suffered an explanatory gap
between neurobiological mechanisms and symptom-level behaviours. Mathematical attempts
to bridge different levels of description are few, but only by working across levels that span
computational theory to neural implementation and back, can we better understand the neuro-
cognitive impairments causing psychiatric disorders.
Here, we illustrate that ADHD can be described in terms of impaired neural gain across different
levels of analysis. Based on the premise that the brain needs to arbitrate between exploration
and exploitation, we show that an increased behavioural variability in ADHD can be expressed as
neural gain impairments by an increased decision temperature parameter at an algorithmic level,
as well as by catecholaminergic impairments at a neural implementation level.
Similarly, we can conceptualise key symptoms of ADHD as stemming from neural gain impair-
ments. For example, inattention can be seen as a frequent shifting between different goals and
an inability to stay with, and focus on, the currently most valuable option (as illustrated in Box 4).
Likewise, decreased neural gain and, hence, behavioural switching may contribute to hyperac-
tivity. By contrast, it can be conceptualised as akin to inattention, where frequent switches
between cognitive goals propagate through the motor system and lead to frequent changes in
motor programs, possibly characterising a combined ADHD subtype. A characteristic of such an
impairment might be sudden standing up during class or the abrupt stopping of an ongoing
behaviour. Alternatively, the neural gain impairments could only arise at a motor level, where one
would expect markedly increased, undifferentiated motor actions and an inability to suppress
evanescent, but inappropriate, motor response tendencies without marked inattentive symp-
toms (i.e., hyperactive-impulsive subtype).
Despite a likely heterogeneity in ADHD, we propose that neural gain modulation is a consistent
impairment across many clinical subgroups. We can now hypothesise that ADHD subgroups may
be better delineated by the speciﬁc proﬁle of their neural gain impairments. One subgroup might
primarily suffer from striatal DA impairment, expressing itself by more reward-related stochasticity
and possibly striatal RPE impairments. Another subgroup might lack in frontal NA functioning,
which might be expressed by impaired prefrontal signals and altered multiattribute processing.
However, to be able to dissociate such subgroups, we need to develop better behavioural tasks
and models, further advance computational neuroimaging, and develop neural models that are
capable of dissociating different aspects of neural gain (see Outstanding Questions).
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